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INTRODUCTION

For more than two hundred years courts have attempted to
define the status and character of corporate directors and officers
in an effort to establish and delineate their responsibilities and lia-

bilities. In CharitableCorp. v. Sutton,' an eighteenth century English case, the Lord Chancellor described corporate directors as
both agents and trustees.2 This mixed characterization

was

adopted and subsequently persisted in later American cases3 until
* This Special Project Note is cited as "An HistoricalPerspective (Special Project)"
throughout the Special Project.
1. 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (1742).
2. The court stated:
I take the employment of a director to be of a mixed nature: it partakes of the nature
of a publick office....
Therefore committee-men are most properly agents to those who employ them in
this trust ....

By accepting of a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity
and reasonable diligence . . . and therefore they are within the case of common
trustees.
Id. at 504-06, 26 Eng. Rep. at 644-45.
3. Some of the early cases used the terms "agents" and "trustees" almost interchangeably, while others clearly ascribed one label or the other to corporate directors and
officers. See, e.g., Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503, 507 (1857) (finding that officers
"are trustees of the shareholders"); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 73-74 (La. 1829)
(describing directors as agents who assume a trust for the stockholders); Hun v. Cary, 82
N.Y. 65, 70 (1880) (stating that bank trustees, i.e. directors, have the relationship of
"agents" to the bank and a relationship similar to "trustees" to the depositors); Hodges v.
New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 340 (1850) (holding directors liable as trustees).
By the end of the nineteenth century at least one writer had observed that courts of law
treated directors as agents of the corporation, while equity courts viewed them as trustees of
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courts finally determined that directors and officers are fiduciaries"
who have a "distinct legal relationship" 5 with the corporation. As
fiduciaries, directors and officers must conform to the duty of care'
and the duty of loyalty,7 duties that courts have recognized and
imposed since at least the mid-eighteenth century.'
II.

THE DUTY OF CARE

Perhaps the earliest American case to recognize that directors
must exercise due care and diligence in the management of a business was Percy v. Millaudon.9 Since that decision other courts
have imposed the same requirement on directors and officers, 10 but
have disagreed as to the appropriate standard of care to which dithe corporation and the shareholders. See S. THOMPSON, LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AND AGENTS
OF CORPORATIONS 351 (1880).
Later cases continued to characterize directors and officers as agents, trustees, or both.
See, e.g., Sequoia Vacuum Sys. v. Stransky, 229 Cal. App. 2d 281, 40 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1964);
Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
Although courts referred to directors and officers as agents or trustees, they acknowledged that these labels did not provide an accurate description. See Spering's Appeal, 71
Pa. 11, 20 (1872) (recognizing that directors technically are not trustees); accord Sequoia
Vacuum Sys., 229 Cal. App. 2d at 287, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 206. Several commentators have
stated that although corporate directors and officers possess characteristics similar to agents
and trustees, these labels are misnomers to a certain degree. See, e.g., W. GRANGE, CORPORATION LAW FOR OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 404705 (1940); W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.06 (3d ed. 1978); Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U.L. REv. 12, 12-15 (1939).
4. See, e.g., Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 463, 94 A. 995, 999 (1915); Babineaux v.
Judiciary Comm'n, 341 So. 2d 396, 400 (La. 1976); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5
A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (holding that directors and officers have a fiduciary relationship with
the corporation and its shareholders); Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 693, 405 S.W.2d 577,
581 (1963) (stating that a majority of courts impose a fiduciary duty on directors and officers); see also Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors'Liability for
Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. Rav. 157, 161 (1970); Note, Liability of Directorsfor Negligent Mismanagement, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 364, 366 (1934); cf. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (indicating that directors are a special type of fiduciary because they
always have a degree of personal interest in their corporate undertakings), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
5. Some writers, observing that no one particular term aptly describes a director or
an officer, conclude a director stands in a "distinct legal relationship" with the corporation
and its shareholders. See, e.g., Uhlman, supra note 3, at 16 (quoting 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS § 1399 (1908)); Note, supra note 4, at 366.
6. See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
8. See Charitable Corp., 2 Atk. at 406, 26 Eng. Rep. at 645 (requiring directors to
exercise their trust "with fidelity and reasonable diligence").
9. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 74-75 (La. 1829).
10. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between
the duty of care imposed on directors and on officers).

1987]

DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY

rectors and officers must conform. The various cases analyzing the
appropriate degree of care required have produced three basic, but
divergent, standards. These three common-law standards, which
all include some degree of negligence, are (1) only the degree of
care required to avoid gross negligence,1 ' (2) the degree of care
that an ordinarily prudent director in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, 2 and (3) the degree of care that
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in conducting personal business affairs.'" Three states previously did not hold directors and officers liable for any degree of negligence, instead imposing liability only in cases of fraud or intentional misconduct. 4
11. See, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 200 (1847) (holding that bank
directors are liable only for errors "of the grossest kind"); Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 74-75, 78
(concluding that bank directors must devote only "ordinary care and attention" to their jobs
in order to avoid making gross errors); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 24 (holding that directors incur liability "for gross inattention and negligence," but not "for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be... absurd and ridiculous" as long as the errors were made
honestly); see also Recent Cases, Corporations-Officers-Degreeof Care Required of Corporate Directors, 16 MINN.L. REv.588 (1932) (discussing the various standards of care).
Delaware recently adopted this gross negligence standard. See infra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963); Neese, 218 Tenn. at 694-95, 405
S.W.2d at 581.
13. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Smith, 161 Md. 398, 403, 157 A. 299, 301 (1931); Hun, 82
N.Y. at 71; Hodges, 1 R.I. at 348; Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Say. Bank, 85 Va. 676,
684, 8 S.E. 586, 590 (1889).
Hun stands in sharp contrast to Spering's Appeal; both represent major cases at opposite ends of the spectrum concerning the degree of care required of directors and officers.
The Hun court questioned and rejected the low standard of care articulated in Spering's
Appeal. Although both courts concluded that ordinary skill and diligence were required,
each interpreted this requirement differently. See, e.g., Adkins & Janis, Some Observations
on Liabilities of CorporateDirectors, 20 Bus. LAw. 817, 818-20 (1965). Many scholars have
commented on the impact of the two courts' divergent views. See, e.g., Rhoads, Personal
Liability of Corporate Mismanagement, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 128, 129-44 (1916) (indicating
that subsequent Pennsylvania cases moved away from the Spering's Appeal position and
closer to the Hun view).
One commentator has suggested that the differing standards of an "ordinarily prudent
man in his own affairs" and an "ordinarily prudent director" have not resulted in any "significant differences in [the] outcome" of cases. Dyson, The Director'sLiability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 344 (1965). Professor Dyson contends that courts actually were referring to the "ordinary director" and that "ordinary care" was the standard applied to all
directors. Id. at 344-45.
14. See Dyson, supra note 13, at 371 (discussing the apparent lack of a negligence
standard in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wisconsin); Lewis, supra note 4, at 162 (stating that
the common law of Kentucky and Wisconsin have not imposed liability on directors unless
they act in bad faith and that Tennessee adopted the same approach by statute).
Under Tennessee law, bank directors were not liable for any conduct short of "fraud or
willful mismanagement" until 1968, when the state legislature enacted the following standard of care for corporate directors and officers: that degree of care "which ordinarily pru-
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A majority of the states have codified the common-law duty of
care. Most have adopted the "ordinarily prudent director in a like
position under similar circumstances" standard.15 The Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act or MBCA) and the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act (Revised Model Act or Revised
MBCA) also embrace this standard.le Statutes in other jurisdictions adopt different standards or contain only indirect references
to a standard, often in the indemnification part of the state's cordent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-1-813 (1984). For the earlier version of the law, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-218 (1955).
Tennessee recently revised its Business Corporation Act; the new Act will become effective
in October 1987. The new Act, based on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, retains the same standard of care enunciated in the 1968 law. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-8301, 48-1-403 (Supp. 1986).
Apparently, Kentucky and Wisconsin still require bad faith before they will impose
liability on directors. See, e.g., Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963);
Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 120 Wis. 2d 103, 352 N.W.2d 223 (1984); Killen v. State Bank, 106
Wis. 546, 82 N.W. 536 (1900).
Indiana recently amended its statute governing directors' standard of conduct. Directors incur liability for a breach of the duty of care only if they engage in "willful misconduct
or recklessness." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35 (Burns Supp. 1986). This language appears to
preclude liability for negligence. See infra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes
200-05 and accompanying text.
15. State statutes that follow this standard of care include: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74
(1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101 (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-152 (1982 & Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-91.5 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:91 (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13A, § 716 (West Supp. 1986); MD CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1985); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541 (West
1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.251, 302A.361 (West 1985); MONT.CODE ANN. § 35-1-401
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1983); N.H. REV. SWAT.ANN. § 293-A:35 (Supp. 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. ] 14A]:6-14 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 715, 717 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701. 59 (Anderson 1985); O. REV. STAT. § 57.228 (1984); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1986); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-33 (1956); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-13-150 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-813 (1984); WASH. REV.CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.343 (Supp. 1987). California and Washington also require directors to make a
reasonable inquiry into corporate matters.
Effective July 1, 1986, the Delaware statute allows a corporation to eliminate, in its
charter, a director's liability for breaches of the duty of care. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1986); see also infra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes 206-07 and
accompanying text.
16. The Model Act provides that "[a] director shall perform his duties ... in good
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances." MODEL BUSINESS CORP.ACT § 35 (1978); see REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT § 8.30(a) (reprinted infra Revised Model Act (Special Project) notes 28 & 35-36 and
accompanying text).
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poration statute.17 Some states have not codified a duty of care
standard, but have identified certain actions for which directors
and officers may be liable."5 Only a minority of states specifically
subject the officers of a corporation, in addition to the directors, to
a statutorily imposed duty of care standard. 9
The modern trend is for courts to demand that directors and
officers exercise the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances would exercise.2 0
This expression of the standard of care is sufficiently flexible to
17. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (Supp. 1986) (allowing indemnification for
directors and officers who have "acted in good faith and in a manner [they] reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation"); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 78.751 (Michie 1986) (permitting indemnification of directors and officers who act in
good faith and in, or at least not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1031 (West 1986) (adopting the good faith/reasonable belief standard);
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 2.41 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1986) (stating that directors
are not liable for their acts if they exercise ordinary care and act in good faith); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985) (requiring directors to use good faith business judgment).
Many of the states mentioned supra note 15 and infra note 18 also have indemnity
statutes for directors and officers similar to the Kansas and Nevada statutes.
18. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.05.216, 10.05.219 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10048 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-308 (1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-342 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, para. 8.65 (Smith-Hurd 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.240 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1981 & Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.345 (Vernon

1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-5-15-47-5-21 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-44
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1891 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-102 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.40 (West 1957 & Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-141 (1977).
Essentially, these statutes provide that directors incur liability if they vote for or assent
to: (1) a declaration of dividends or distribution of assets to shareholders contrary to state
law or the corporation's charter; (2) the corporation's purchase of its own shares of stock
contrary to state statutes; or (3) the distribution of assets to shareholders during liquidation
of the corporation without paying or discharging debts and other obligations. Directors presumably assent to these actions unless a dissent is recorded in the corporate minutes. Directors may escape liability if they act in good faith and reasonably rely on financial information provided by the officers in charge of the corporate books or on a written report by a
public or certified public accountant. Likewise, other state statutes allow directors to rely on
information presented to them by officers or qualified professionals.
19. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-152 (1982 & Supp 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
496A.34, 496A.44 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (West Supp. 1986);

MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541
(West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.251, 302A.361 (West 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
715, 717 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408
(Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-1-813 (1984) (effective October 1, 1987: §§ 48-8-301, 48-8-403).
Perhaps other state statutes omit officers because the jurisdiction's case law only refers
to directors or because the legislatures have assumed that the courts will determine and
impose the appropriate standard of care on officers.
20. See Comment, Director Liability Under the Business Judgment Rule: Fact or
Fiction?, 35 Sw. L.J. 775, 787 (1981). A majority of states have adopted this approach by
statute. See supra note 15.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:605

apply to a variety of directors and officers who have different responsibilities to the corporation. 2 One justification for the "reasonable director" standard is that if a higher standard were
adopted, qualified persons might not accept positions as corporate
directors. 2 This argument directly addresses the possibility of
qualified individuals 2declining
to serve as outside directors because
s
of potential liability.
Pennsylvania's courts and legislature have vacillated in developing a standard of care for corporate directors and officers. After
much fluctuation, however, the law appears to have returned to the
standard established by the early common law. In 1872 Spering's
Appeal 24 enunciated a low standard of care, holding that directors
were liable only for "gross inattention and negligence. 2 5 Subsequent cases initially rejected this approach, considering it to be too
lenient. 26 However, a more recent case, Smith v. Brown-Borhek
Co., 2 7 returned to the less demanding standard expressed in Spering's Appeal.28 Like its courts, the Pennsylvania legislature has
21. See Comment, supra note 20, at 787. This degree of flexibility is desirable because courts and commentators recognize that the requisite degree of care depends on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132,
147 (1891); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963);
see also Lewis, supra note 4, at 162.
22. See Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847); Smith v. Brown-Borhek
Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964); see also W. GRANGE, supra note 4, at 407;
Miller, The FiduciaryDuties of a CorporateDirector,4 U. BALT. L. REv. 259, 271-72 (1975).
23. See Miller, supra note 22, at 271-72 (stating that without the possibility of indemnification or insurance, outside directors may not be willing to assume the risks associated with a higher duty of care). For a discussion of indemnification and insurance, see infra
Indemnification (Special Project) and Insurance (Special Project).
24. 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
25. Id. at 24 (holding that directors are liable for "gross inattention and negligence,"
but not "for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be . . . absurd and ridiculous").
26. See, e.g., Loan Soc'y v. Eavenson, 248 Pa. 407, 94 A. 121 (1915); Cornell v. Seddinger, 237 Pa. 389, 85 A. 446 (1912); see also Rhoads, supra note 13, at 135-38 (discussing
the evolution of early Pennsylvania case law); Uhlman, The Duty of Corporate Directors to
Exercise Business Judgment, 20 B.U.L. REv. 488, 495 n.28 (1940) (stating that "[tihe rule of
[Spering's Appeal] has disappeared for all practical purposes").
27. 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964).
28. The Brown-Borhek court acknowledged the higher standard of care required by
Pennsylvania's state statute, see infra note 29, but emphasized that "[firom an early date
the Court has consistently recognized the danger of subjecting corporate directors to liability whenever any of the transactions of the company did not meet with success." BrownBorhek, 414 Pa. at 333, 200 A.2d at 401.
A later case, Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966),
distinguished Brown-Borhek and followed the Pennsylvania statute's higher standard of
care of "an ordinary prudent person managing his own personal affairs." After Selheimer
the Pennsylvania legislature amended the state's corporation statute and adopted the less
rigorous standard of "a reasonable director." See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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wavered over the appropriate standard for the duty of care. When
the legislature originally codified the duty of care in 1933, it
adopted a stringent standard requiring the degree of care exemplified by an ordinarily prudent person in the management of personal business affairs. 29 In 1968, however, the legislature apparently concluded that this burden was too heavy and enacted the
less rigorous "ordinarily prudent person in a like position under

similar circumstances" standard.30
Because confusion and diversity abound over which standard
should be employed to determine a director's duty of 'care to the
corporation, at least one commentator has suggested that different
standards should apply to different types and sizes of corporations.3 1 This suggestion is supported by a great body of case law
which concludes that, in matters of care and diligence, each case
must be decided based on its particular facts and circumstances. 2
Another commentator suggests that only two elements are necessary to satisfy a reasonable standard of care: (1) "alertness to potentially significant corporate problems;" and (2) "deliberative
decisionmaking on issues of fundamental corporate concern."3 3
Alertness to corporate problems demands only ordinary care and
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (Purdon 1967).
30. Id. § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1986).

Even after this legislative amendment, the Pennsylvania courts rendered varied opinions regarding the standard to impose on directors. In 1974 a federal district court, employing Pennsylvania law, applied the older and harsher statutory standard and cited the 1933
statute. See Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir.
1975). The court acknowledged that this was "a higher duty of care ... than [that imposed
by] the common law" of Pennsylvania. Id. Nevertheless, the defendants in this case were
found not liable because the plaintiffs failed to prove proximate cause. For a discussion of
proximate cause, see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Another federal district
court subsequently applied the current statutory standard of care. See United States v.
Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583-84 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
31. See Lynch, Diligence of Directors in the Management of Corporations,3 CALIF.
L. REv. 21, 28-29 (1914). Mr. Lynch suggested that classifying corporations by type or size
would lead to more realistic rules governing the standard of care for directors. His suggestions for appropriate groupings are "(a) ordinary manufacturing, mining, or trading corporations; (b) monied corporations, as banks or insurance companies; (c)public service corporations; [and] (d) charitable, educational, or religious corporations." Id.
Another author argues that courts may reach divergent results in cases with essentially
the same facts, depending on whether the directors and officers are associated with a large
or a small corporation. See M. FEUER, PERSONAL LiALrr.s OF CORPRATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS 35-36 (2d ed. 1974).
32. See, e.g., Briggs, 14 U.S. at 147; Allis-Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. at 84, 188 A.2d at
130; Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880); Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 693, 405 S.W.2d
577, 581 (1963).
33. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REv. 591, 613 (1983).
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attention to corporate matters, but the degree of alertness depends
on the circumstances and the particular business in which the corporation engages.34 Deliberative decisionmaking requires obtaining
adequate information and employing this information to make a
rational business decision.3 5 According to this commentator, courts
are more likely to delve into the degree of care and attention directors and officers devote to business matters than into the decisionmaking process itself. 8
All courts agree that directors and officers must act with some
degree of diligence and care,3 but the various formulations of the
duty of care are vague and provide little guidance regarding the
particular conduct required of directors and officers. Some courts
and commentators have suggested basic, but not necessarily exhaustive, expectations of directors and officers. 8 Among these postulations are that directors should supervise corporate expenditures, 9 disburse corporate funds appropriately 4 0 keep themselves
informed of the corporation's affairs,4 1 attend board meetings,4
and reasonably supervise officers and managers.43 No jurisdiction,
however, expects directors, especially outside directors, 4 to bear
34. Id. at 613-15.
35. Id. at 615-26.
36. Id. at 613-27. Instead of inquiring too deeply into the decisionmaking process,
courts generally find "refuge in the business judgment rule." Id. at 617. For a discussion of
the business judgment rule, see infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
37. The primary disagreement concerns the standard to which directors and officers
should be held. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966);
M. FEUER, supra note 31, at 33.
40. See Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 278 N.E.2d 642, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431
(1972).

41. See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Cohen v. Cocoline
Prods., Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 123, 127 N.E.2d 906, 907 (1955); Francis v. United Jersey Bank,
87 N.J. 15, 32, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (1981); M. FEUER, supra note 31, at 33-35; W. GRANGE,
supra note 3, at 410; CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1602 (1978) [hereinafter Guidebook].
42. See Williams v. Brady, 232 F. 740,744 (D.N.J. 1916); W. GRANGE, supra note 3, at
408-09; Guidebook, supra note 41, at 1602.
43. See Briggs, 141 U.S. at 147, 165; Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 473, 94 A. 995,
1003 (1915); Allis-Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. at 84-85, 188 A.2d at 130; W. KNEPPER, supra note
3, § 5.01; Lewis, supra note 4, at 165.
44. See, e.g., Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 652-53 (Iowa 1979)
(stating that "[a]n outside director is usually defined as one who is neither an officer nor an
employee of the corporation" and that outside directors "should [not] substitute their judgment for that of those in active control of decision making"); Cohn, supra note 33, at 609
(iterating that outside directors cannot be "primary decisionmakers"); Hahn & Manzoni,
The Monitoring Committee and Outside Directors' Evolving Duty of Care, 9 Loy. U. CHL L.
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the entire burden of operating a corporation. Directors have discretion to delegate the actual operation of the corporation to management.4 5 Likewise, directors generally can rely on financial reports
and other information supplied by officers, employees, outside professionals, and board committees."
When forced to assess a director's or officer's liability for violating the duty of care, a court initially considers whether the director or officer actually violated the duty of care and then considers whether the director's or officer's conduct proximately caused
the alleged harm or loss to the stockholders or corporation.4 7 If the
director's or officer's behavior was not the proximate cause of the
injury, no liability will attach.4" The burden is on the party alleging harm to prove that but for the director's or officer's dereliction
of duty, the loss would not have occurred. 9
III.

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

The business judgment rule developed concurrently with the
duty of care. 50 In fact, the cases in which courts originally articulated the duty of care also discussed the business judgment of directors and officers.51 Many of these early cases simply stated that
J. 587, 614 (1978) (stating that outside directors delegate operational functions to
management).
45. See Briggs, 141 U.S. at 163, 165; W. KNEPPER, supra note 3, § 5.01; Guidebook,
supra note 41, at 1603.
46. See Allis-Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130 (stating that directors can
rely on others and have "no duty... to install and operate a corporate system of espionage
to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists"); W. GRANGE, supra
note 3, at 407; Guidebook, supra note 41, at 1602-03; see also supra note 18.
47. See Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 969 (3rd
Cir. 1975) (holding that directors' and officers' breach of duty must proximately cause harm
to the corporation before liability will be imposed); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1924) (deciding that a plaintiff must not only prove that a director neglected the
duty of care, but also that the director's negligence caused the loss); Comment, supra note
20, at 789.
48. See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (finding the defendant-director not liable despite his breach of the duty of care because the evidence did not prove that
the defendant-director caused the loss or could have prevented it); cf. Lippitt, 89 Conn. at
475, 94 A. at 1003 (holding bank directors liable for losses proximately caused by their failure to supervise and oversee bank operations).
49. See Barnes, 298 F. at 616.
50. See Cohn, supra note 33, at 603.
51. See, e.g., Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829) (holding that directors are liable only for business mistakes "of so gross a kind that a man of common sense,
and ordinary attention, would not have [committed them]"); Hun, 82 N.Y. at 74 (noting
that a director must "exercise ordinary skill and judgment ... [and that] [w]hen damage is
caused by his want of judgment, he cannot excuse himself by alleging his gross ignorances");
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 24 (concluding that directors "are not liable for mistakes of
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directors and officers were not liable for honest mistakes or errors
of judgment.52 Other cases held that directors and officers incurred
liability only for errors "of the grossest kind.

'53

Several courts and

commentators have articulated their own formulations of the business judgment rule. 54 The rule basically states that if any rational
business purpose exists for directors' or officers' decisions, they are
not liable for errors in judgment when their decisions result in an
unfavorable outcome for the corporation. The modern expression
judgment").
52. See, e.g., Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 'Ala. 503, 509 (1857); Hun, 82 N.Y. at 70;

Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 348 (1850).
53. Godbold, 11 Ala. at 200; see also Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 78. But cf. Spering's
Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872) (concluding that directors are not responsible for even "absurd
and ridiculous" errors of judgment if they are made honestly and "within the scope of the
[directors'] powers").
54. One court defined the business judgment rule as follows:
When [directors] act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business judgment..., which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their decisions. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse
of discretion, courts will not interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
In an earlier decision, another court proffered a similar synopsis of the business judgment rule:
If in the course of management [directors] arrive at a decision for which there is a
reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they honestly believe to
be for the best interests of the [corporation], it is not the function of the court to say
that it would have acted differently and to charge the directors for any loss or expenditures incurred.
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (1944).
One commentator proposed the following as a comprehensive statement of the business
judgment rule:
A corporate transaction that involves no self-dealing by, or other personal interest of,
the directors who authorized the transaction will not be enjoined or set aside for the
directors' failure to satisfy the standards that govern a director's performance of his or
her duties, and directors who authorized the transaction will not be held personally
liable for resultant damages, unless:
(1) the directors did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available
facts before voting to authorize the transaction; or
(2) the directors voted to authorize the transaction even though they did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the transaction to be for the best
interest of the corporation; or
(3) in some other way the directors' authorization of the transaction was not in
good faith.
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOPSTRA L. REv. 93, 111-12 (1979).
55. See, e.g., Casey, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43 (stating that directors do not incur liability when they exercise reasonable business judgments that later prove to be "faulty"); Otis
& Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 61 F. Supp. 905, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (noting that "mistakes or
errors in the exercise of honest business judgment do not subject the officers and directors
to liability for negligence in the discharge of their appointed duties").
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of the rule essentially follows the reasoning applied in some of the
early cases 56 and absolves directors of liability for acts short of
gross negligence or fraud.51 This assumes, of course, that the directors and officers actually have exercised business judgment."8 Some
courts even have by-passed the traditional duty of care analysis
and proceeded directly to an application of the business judgment
rule."9
The issue arises of whether the business judgment rule has
supplanted the duty of care. At least one commentator suggests
that currently the primary inquiry is whether directors and officers
0 If directors and officers exactually exercised business judgment.1
ercise business judgment, some courts will not delve further into
the matter because these courts presume that directors and officers
exercised reasonable care and diligence during the decisionmaking
process. 6' Given this presumption, can the business judgment rule
56. See, e.g., Goldbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 200-01 (1847) (asserting that
"bank directors are not responsible for errors of judgment, unless the error be of the grossest kind"); Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. at 508 (indicating that when directors and officers
exercise business judgment, courts will not interfere unless their judgment is "a willful
abuse of their discretion, or the result of bad faith, or of a willful neglect or breach of a
known duty").
57. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974) (finding
that "the business judgment rule weighs in favor of the directors' decision ... unless the
complaining shareholders can prove fraud or a clearly inadequate sale price"); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (stating that "a court will not
interfere with the judgment of a board of directors unless there is a showing of gross and
palpable overreaching"); see also Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 77 YAL9 L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968)
(stating that liability for "mere negligence" is rare). But see Casey, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (indicating that the somewhat higher standard of "reasonable diligence" applies).
58. See Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 609 (stating that the business judgment rule has no applicability unless "informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment"); Hun v. Cary,
82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880) (holding that errors of judgment are not excused by "gross ignorance"
and that directors must "exercise proper care and diligence").
59. See, e.g., Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D.
Ill. 1969) (eliminating any due care analysis by holding that the business judgment rule
required the plaintiffs to "prove fraud or ... oppressive conduct").

60. See Cohn, supra note 33, at 594 (asserting that courts now initially inquire into
whether directors exercised their business judgment rather than first considering whether
they met the requisite duty of care).
Another commentator predicts "that the distinction between the business judgment
rule and the negligence rule [i.e., duty of care] ...which is already somewhat obscure, will
largely vanish." Cary & Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present Day
Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61, 70 (spec. issue 1972) (comments by Professor

Cary).
61. See, e.g., Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 608-09; Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720 (noting that
"[a] board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions
will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose").
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co-exist with the duty of care, or does the rule override this duty?
At least one case62 explicitly asserts that no conflict exists between
the two requirements."3 Other cases indicate that the business
judgment rule supersedes even the need to consider the duty of
care.6 4 In its pure form, however, the business judgment rule
should be applied only after ascertaining whether the directors and
officers actually made a business decision and, if so, whether they
exercised the requisite degree of care during the decisionmaking
process.6 5 If the directors and officers exercised appropriate care,
but their judgment proves to be faulty, courts should determine
whether the directors and officers made a business decision that
they honestly believed to be within their authority and in legitimate furtherance of the corporation's best interests.6 6 If so, the
business judgment rule should be applied and no liability should
attach. 7
Courts and commentators have posited various rationales for
the viability of the business judgment rule. Three primary justifications are that (1) directors and officers are not infallible, 8 (2)
competent directors would not accept directorships without some
assurance of protection for mistakes," and (3) courts have neither
the ability nor the desire to substitute their judgment for that of
more experienced professionals.70 Adherence to the business judg62. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1944).
63. The Casey court stated:
[H]ow does the operation of the . . . "business judgment rule" tie in with the concept of
negligence [i.e., the duty of care]? There is no conflict between the two. When courts
say that they will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed that
judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised. A director cannot close his
eyes to what is going on about him in the conduct of the business of the corporation
and have it said that he is exercising business judgment. Courts have properly decided
to give directors a wide latitude in the management of the affairs of a corporation provided always that judgment, and that means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them.
Casey, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
64. See, e.g., Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 608-09; Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720.
65. See Guidebook, supra note 41, at 1604.
66. See Arsht, supra note 54, at 114; Cohn, supra note 33, at 604.
67. See Arsht, supra note 54, at 119-20.
68. See Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611, 620, 83 So. 860, 863 (1919) (asserting that a
director "is not supposed to be infallible, and does not stipulate against error"); Scott v.
Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513, 535 (N.Y. Ch. 1833) (finding that a director or officer "is not
supposed to have attained infallibility").
69. See Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 78; Brown-Borhek, 414 Pa. at 333, 200 A.2d at 401
(stating that directors "would rarely ever accept a directorship if they could be held liable
for every 'bad' account or every mistake of judgment"); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 21.
70. See Karasik v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 97, 180 A. 604, 611 (1935)

1987]

DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY

ment rule protects directors and officers who assume the necessary
risks inherent in the operation of a corporation."1 Individuals with
desirable skills and ability, therefore, are more likely to assume the
responsibilities of a directorship if they do not fear a lawsuit each
time a decision, in hindsight, proves to be improvident.7 2
The business judgment rule provides significant protection to
directors and officers. Courts, however, have limited the rule to ensure that directors and officers will not automatically escape liability for all possible actions. Courts will not apply the rule and exempt a director from liability if fraud, s illegality,7 4 gross
negligence,75 or a conflict of interest 6 exists. Thus, directors and
(holding that courts will not substitute their judgment for that of directors and officers in
cases of "mere mistake"); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A.
654, 659 (1928) (concluding that, absent fraud, directors' decisions are final and a court's
role is not to resolve business disputes); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979) (emphasizing that one justification for
the business judgment rule is that directors are qualified to make business decisions while
"courts are ill equipped" to do so); Guidebook, supra note 41, at 1604.
71. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978) (indicating that the business judgment rule affords directors wide discretion in managing "corporate affairs"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); M. FEUER, supra note 31, at 37 (stating
that "[t]he very nature of managing business enterprises for profit requires continuous risktaking and. . . [t]o apply an unduly rigorous standard of care might dilute the incentive to
aggressive action which has been a necessary condition for the success of American
capitalism").
72. See Dyson, supra note 13, at 367.
73. See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 658-60 (Del. Ch.
1975) (finding that directors had discretion regarding the timing of dividend payments and
that their decision to delay payment should not be questioned by the court unless the plaintiff showed "fraud or gross abuse of discretion"); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del.
Ch. 1971) (holding that the business judgment rule applies absent a showing of fraud, bad
faith, or reckless conduct by directors); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 54-55, 158 A.2d 136,
141 (1960) (stating that directors' business judgment will not be questioned unless the
plaintiffs prove fraud or other misconduct).
74. See, e.g., Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 55-56, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1947) (holding
that directors may incur liability if they use corporate property for an illegal purpose).
75. See, e.g., Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1973)
(stating that the court would not intervene in a suit to enjoin a merger for alleged inadequacy of price unless the disparity of the selling price and the value of the assets was so
great that directors must have acted recklessly or in bad faith); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del.
Ch. 148, 157, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966) (stating that courts will interfere only if directors
act in bad faith or grossly abuse their discretion); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 107,
250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (1978). But see Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232, 43 N.E.2d 18, 1920 (1942) (noting that even gross errors of judgment can be excused).
76. See, e.g., Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 193, 135 P. 496,
499-500 (1913) (finding that the good faith of the corporation's director-president, who entered into a contract for secret profits, did not protect him from liability when he acted
adversely to the corporation's interests); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del.
Ch. 1980) (stating that "[t]he business judgment rule is a presumption that a rational business decision of the officers or directors of a corporation is proper unless there exists [sic]

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

618

[Vol. 40:605

officers are not completely immune from suit and must account for
their decisions when they overstep the bounds of the business
judgment rule. 77
In addition to overcoming the presumption that directors and
officers have exercised business judgment, plaintiffs also bear the
burden of proving that the business judgment rule is inapplicable.78 If the plaintiffs meet their burden of proof and establish that
self-dealing or other conflicts of interest operate to remove the protection of the rule, the burden shifts to the director or officer to
prove the fairness of the transaction."

IV. A COMPARISON OF VARious TYPES OF
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

State statutes and case law require directors and officers to
conform to some standard of care in performing their corporate
responsibilities. That standard, however, may vary among jurisdictions depending on several distinct factors, including the type of
corporation, the position held by the director or officer, and how
much negligence the jurisdiction will tolerate.6 0 In addition, numerous courts and scholars have discussed the distinctions between directors and officers,"' inside and outside directors,8 2 and
facts which remove the decision from the protection of the rule-such as self-dealing, conflict of interest, etc.").
77.

Although many courts recite various limitations on the business judgment rule,

few actually find that directors' or officers' actions fall within these limitations. Thus, the
rule often shields directors and officers from liability except in egregious cases of misconduct. See, e.g., Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 135 P. 496 (1913)
(holding director liable for obtaining secret profits).
78. See Arsht, supra note 54, at 130-33 (explaining that the presumption in favor of
directors' and officers' business judgment is rebuttable, but places the burden on the plaintiff to disprove the business judgment rule defense); see also Marks v. Wolfson, 41 Del. Ch.
115, 127, 188 A.2d 680, 685 (1963) (holding that in a minority stockholders' challenge to the
price for the sale of corporate assets, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the
directors acted in bad faith); Gropper v. North Cent. Texas Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 202,
114 A.2d 231, 233 (1955) (finding that in a challenge to the sufficiency of a proxy statement
to ratify the sale of assets, directors are presumed to have exercised business judgment
"honestly and in good faith," and that the plaintiffs have the burden of proving an unfair
contract unless fraud is present); cf. Bellis, 373 F. Supp. at 124 (finding that, in an arm's
length transaction, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the "defendants breached
their duty and that the conduct complained of was not fair or in the interest of the
corporation").
79. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
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bank directors and other corporate directors.8 3
Although directors and officers have similar fiduciary obligations to the corporation and to its shareholders, 4 some courts hold
officers to a higher degree of care than directors.85 This variance in
the requisite degree of care arises from the dichotomy between directors' and officers' duties. 86 Officers assume responsibility for the
daily operation and management of a corporation.87 Conversely,
the board of directors advises management88 and formulates corporate policy,89 with little or no direct involvement in the corporation's daily operations.90 While directors in small corporations
often exercise significant control over the affairs of the corporation,
directors in large, publicly held corporations generally are removed
from the management of the corporation. 1 In addition, directors
usually can rely on officers' reports concerning finances and other
83.
84.

See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
See W. GRANGE, supra note 3, at 444-45.

85. See, e.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-31 (1920) (concluding that the president would be held to a greater degree of care because he controlled the bank's business
affairs, and holding the director, who had less involvement with the daily business operations, not liable); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1178, 313 S.W.2d 802, 808 (1958) (stating
that "Itihe law imposes a high standard of conduct upon an officer or director of a corporation," but imposes "[e]ven a higher standard of duty" on one who is a vice-president, director, and manager of a bank); San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74, 81-82, 53 P.
410, 412 (1898); Masonic Bldg. Corp. v. Carlsen, 128 Neb. 108, 131-32, 258 N.W. 44, 55
(1934).
As illustrated in Bates, the president of a bank may be held to an even higher standard
of care than other directors and officers because the president assumes the greatest burden
in managing the bank. See Brown v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 88 Tex. 265, 275, 31
S.W. 285, 288 (1895) (stating that directors elect the president, who "has great influence
upon the policy of the [bank] and the conduct of the various employes [sic] in the discharge
of their duties").
86. See Soderquist, Toward a More Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles
of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1341, 1343 (1977); Mace, The President and the
Board of Directors, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar. - Apr. 1972.
87. Soderquist, supra note 86, at 1343; Mace, supra note 86, at 37.
88. See Mace, supra note 86, at 37. According to Professor Mace, the role of the
board of directors is largely advisory and not of a decisionmaking nature.
89. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963) (noting that modern corporate directors "confine their control to the broad policy decisions").
90. See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (stating that "directors are not expected to interfere individually in the actual conduct [of the corporation's
affairs]"); Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 Ill. App. 179, 181-82, 50 N.E.2d 602, 603 (1943)
(holding that directors, by "necessity," must delegate much authority to subordinates).
91. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.01 official comment at 195 (1985)
(recognizing that in large, publicly held corporations "it is not feasible to impose a requirement that the business and affairs of the corporation be managed 'by' the board of directors
...since the role of the board of directors consists principally of the formulation of major
management policy with little or no direct involvement in day-to-day management").

620

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:605

selected matters.9 2 Officers, therefore, are held to a higher duty of
care regarding the preparation and analysis of information
presented to the board of directors.
Courts and commentators emphasize the distinctions between
inside and outside directors more often than they distinguish between directors and officers. 93 When differentiating between inside
and outside directors, courts hold inside directors to a higher standard of care because they participate more fully in the daily operations of the corporation. 4 The assumption, therefore, is that inside
directors have more knowledge and awareness of the management
of the corporation.95 Conversely, outside directors have less time to
devote to the daily operations of the corporation.9" Another justification for this differentiation is that corporations could not attract
qualified people to outside directorships if they were as accounta92. See M. FEUER, supra note 31, at 27. State statutes generally allow directors to
rely on reports of officers and other specific individuals. The California statute, for example,
provides as follows:
[A] director shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements,
including financial statements and other financial data, in each case prepared or
presented by:
(1) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented,
(2) Counsel, independent accountants or other persons as to matters which the
director believes to be within such person's professional or expert competence, or
(3) A committee of the board upon which the director does not serve, as to matters
within its designated authority, which committee the director believes to merit confidence....
CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(b) (West 1977); see also infra note 98.
93. Inside directors are corporate officers or employees. Some directors do not fit
neatly into the broad categories of "inside" and "outside" directors. For example, the corporation's legal counsel, the corporation's banker, retired executives of the corporation, and
representatives of major suppliers or customers of the corporation blur the inside-outside
director distinction. See Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 652 (Iowa 1979).
94. See Bynum v. Scott, 217 F. 122, 125 (E.D.N.C. 1914) (stating that "[w]hen ... a
director is also president and secretary of the corporation, and assumes the actual and sole
active management of the business. . . a very much higher degree of care is required" than
for non-officer directors); see also W. KNEPPER, supra note 3, § 1.09 (noting that "inside
directors who are also corporate officers are usually the real managers of the organization");
Soderquist, supra note 86, at 1351 n.61 (stating that "[u]nlike outside directors, the obligation of inside directors ... is only to their corporation").
95. See W. KNEPPER, supra note 3, § 1.09 (noting that the higher standard of conduct
for inside directors "reflect[s] their . . . greater familiarity with the affairs of the
corporation").
96. See Soderquist, supra note 86, at 1351 (stating that "one thing almost all outside
directors have in common is a scarcity of time"); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1481 (1984)
(stating that, on the average, directors devote 1.5 working days per month to board work);
Comment, supra note 20, at 778 (noting that "[r]estraints on time and information limit
severely the amount of impact that outside directors can have upon corporate affairs").
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ble as inside directors for mistakes in business judgment.17
Because outside directors have limited time to devote to the
corporation, they, in particular, can rely on reports and evaluations
made by officers, outside professionals, and board committees." As
a result of their lack of time to become involved in the details of
the corporation's business, outside directors act in more of an advisory capacity,9" functioning in "a more general decisionmaking and
supervisory role."'100
Views diverge concerning whether different standards of care
should be applied to inside and outside directors. At least one
court' has held that an outside director's due diligence defense of
relying on the opinions of officers and auditors is not sufficient to
shield the director from liability for a misleading registration statement.102 Some commentators, however, suggest that given the role
of and constraints on outside directors, the only reasonable standard for imposing liability on outside directors is that of "gross
negligence or inattention to duty."103 This attitude is reflected in
various court decisions holding that an outside director who has
only "limited factual information" is not liable for "breaching his
97. Soderquist, supra note 86, at 1349 (asserting that "it would realistically be very
difficult if not impossible to secure the services of able and experienced [outside] corporate
directors" if they were required to devote substantial time to the corporation) (quoting
Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964)) (emphasis deleted).
98. See, e.g., Rowen, 282 N.W.2d at 653 (concluding that outside directors "may
within reasonable limits rely on those who have primary responsibility for the corporate
business"). W. KNEPPER,.supra note 3, §§ 1.11-1.14 (discussing the role of outside directors
and their reliance on others).
99. See Miller, supra note 22, at 271 (emphasizing that outside directors provide "advice and counsel on very broad questions of policy"); see also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
100. Soderquist, supra note 86, at 1343.
101. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
102. The BarChris court found that two outside directors who relied on reports from
officers and a professional auditing firm before signing registration statements soon after
their election to the board of directors had not met their burden of proving due diligence.
The court reasoned that:
[An outside director] is presumed to know his responsibility when he becomes a director. He can escape liability only by using that reasonable care to investigate the facts
which a prudent man would employ in the management of his own property .... [A]
prudent man would not act in an important matter without any knowledge of the relevant facts, in sole reliance upon representations of persons who are comparative strangers and upon general information which does not purport to cover the particular case.
Id. at 688.
103. Miller, supra note 22, at 271; cf. Cary & Harris, supra note 60, at 64-65 (implying
that both a low standard of care for outside directors and a higher standard for inside directors are reasonable).
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duty of care when he does not oversee management."' 104 One argument for not distinguishing between inside and outside directors is
that state statutes generally do not make this differentiation.0' A
persuasive counterargument, however, is that most duty of care
statutes impose liability on directors "in a like position under similar circumstances.' '106 The nature of their involvement with the
corporation places inside and outside directors in different positions and often requires them to act under dissimilar
circumstances.
The law governing the duties of directors and officers developed largely from cases concerning bank directors. 107 Some courts
held bank directors and officers to a high degree of care. 08 Other
courts, however, imposed a less stringent standard.0 9 Nevertheless,
one commentator believes that bank directors have the duty to exercise a greater degree of care than directors in other industries.1 10
In contrast, another commentator has suggested that no difference
currently exists between the standards for bank directors and
other directors."' The decline in the number of cases involving
bank directors and officers"' makes it impossible to predict with
104. Hahn & Manzoni, supra note 44, at 614.
105. See Comment, supra note 20, at 780 (noting that "the standard of care applicable
to directors . . . now codified in a number of state corporation acts, makes no distinction
between the functions of inside and outside directors").
106. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Briggs, 141 U.S. at 132; Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 68; Hun, 82 N.Y. at 65;
Marshal v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Say. Bank, 85 Va. 676, 8 S.E. 586 (1889); Charitable
Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (1742).
108. See, e.g., Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930) (holding that bank directors are liable for losses resulting from ordinary negligence in performing
their duties); Greenfield Say. Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. 252, 255-56, 97 N.E. 897, 899900 (1912) (finding that savings bank directors are not excused "for losses due to a mere
error of judgment," nor can they "excuse themselves from the consequences of their misconduct or of their.., negligence by averring that they have failed merely to exercise ordinary
skill, care and vigilance"); Barber v. Kolowich, 283 Mich. 97, 104, 277 N.W. 189, 192 (1938)
(concluding that rules of conduct for directors and officers "should be applied even more
stringently to an officer and director of a bank").
109. See, e.g., Briggs, 141 U.S. at 165-66 (holding bank directors to a gross negligence
standard); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1938) (stating that bank directors are assumed to be "honest and faithful but.

. .

not.

. .

infallible" and that they must

"use ordinary diligence"); Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1928) (stating that
bank directors are subject to "the common-law duty [of care] . . . which ordinarily prudent
men would exercise under similar circumstances"), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1929).
110. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 4, at 163 (commenting that "[i]t is probable that
bank cases should be treated differently from non-bank cases with bank directors held to
stricter standards").
111. See, e.g., Dyson, supra note 13, at 343-44.
112. See Bishop, supra note 57, at 1098-99 (explaining that bank director cases have
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certainty whether a particular jurisdiction will differentiate between bank directors and other directors. The flexible duty of care
standard established by most state statutes,11 however, should result in courts holding bank directors accountable for that degree of
care expected of other bank directors in a like position under similar circumstances rather than
that expected of directors of corpo4
rations in other industries."
V.

THE

DUTY

OF LOYALTY

Since at least 1742 courts have required corporate directors
and officers to discharge their responsibilities with fidelity to the
corporation.11 5 This obligation became known as the duty of loyalty." 6 Historically, directors and officers could not engage in conflict of interest transactions without the risk that a court would
find their dealings to be voidable at the election of the corporation. 1 7 A few courts took a more rigid position and held that conbecome "virtually extinct.., partly because of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and other New Deal reforms, and partly ... because the trend toward fewer and larger
banks has made inexperienced and gullible bank directors scarcer than they used to be").
113. The majority of states have adopted the "ordinarily prudent director in a like
position under similar circumstances" standard. See supra notes 15 & 21 and accompanying
text.
114. In addition, courts often state that each case is decided on its particular facts and
circumstances. See supra note 21. This ensures flexibility and indicates that bank director
cases probably will be decided in light of the facts and circumstances as they apply particularly to bank, rather than nonbank, directors.
115. See Charitable Corp., 2 Atk. at 406, 26 Eng. Rep. at 645.
116. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939). The Guth court
explained the duty of loyalty as follows:
A public policy, existing through the years .

. .

. has established a rule that demands

of a corporate officer or director. . . the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not
only to affirmatively protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge,
but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to
deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it,
or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule
that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there
shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. The occasions for the determination
of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast
rule can be formulated.
Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510. The following is another statement of the duty of loyalty:
It contemplates that a director must refrain from engaging in his own personal activities in such a manner as to injure or take advantage of his corporation... [D]irectors
may not make secret or private profits out of their official positions, and must give to
the corporation the benefit of any advantages they obtain in their official positions.
W. KNEPPER, supra note 3, § 1.05.
117. See, e.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir.
1955) (holding, under Connecticut law and in the context of a shareholders' derivative suit
alleging inadequacy of the price paid for assets of a corporation wholly owned and con.
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flict of interest transactions were void."' Most jurisdictions eventually adopted a more lenient stance and permitted conflict of
interest transactions to stand if they met a test of intrinsic fairness
to the corporation"' and 20if the directors fully disclosed their interests in the transactions.

trolled by directors of the buyer corporation, that "where interested directors participate in
a transaction and their votes are necessary to consummate it, the transaction is voidable
irrespective of its fairness"); Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 616, 156 N.E. 785,
788 (1927) (finding, in a suit to compel directors to account to shareholders for secret profits
they made while acting for the corporation, that if a director does not act "with the utmost
fairness . . . [the transaction] will be set aside"); Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184
N.Y. 152, 162, 76 N.E. 1075, 1078-79 (1906) (stating that actions by individuals who are
directors and officers and who vote to increase their salaries are voidable because they are
influenced by personal interests).
Mallory v. Mallory Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 131, 23 A. 708 (1927), explains clearly the
rationale for declaring transactions involving a conflict of interest to be voidable:
[A]ny one [sic] acting in a fiduciary relation shall not be permitted to make use of that
relation to benefit his own personal interest. This rule . . . extends to all transactions
where the individual's personal interests may be brought into conflict with his acts in
the fiduciary capacity, and it works independently of the question whether there was
fraud or whether there was a good intention . . . [t]he underlying thought is that an
agent or other fiduciary should not unite his personal and his representative characters
in the same transaction; and equity will not permit him to be exposed to the temptation, or be brought into a situation where his own personal interests conflict with the
interests of his principal and with the duties he owes to his principal ....
It is a
violation of his duty for any. . . director acting in his fiduciary capacity to enter into
any contract with himself connected with the trust or its management. Such a contract
is voidable, and may be set aside at the suit of the beneficiary.
Mallory, 61 Conn. at 137-38, 23 A. at 710-11.
118. See, e.g., McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 514, 205 N.W. 583, 586 (1925) (holding that directors' actions were void when they voted on their salaries and then approved
the action in their capacity as controlling shareholders of the corporation); Duncan v. Ponton, 102 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (finding that a director's assent to an unauthorized exchange of corporate property for obligations owed to the corporation's general
manager did not bind the corporation and that the transaction was void); see also Comment, supra note 20, at 783-84 ("findings of fraud, over-reaching, or waste of corporate assets will confer liability upon the offending director and will result in the voiding of the
transaction").
119. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (emphasizing that directors have the burden of proving the "inherent fairness" of their dealings with the corporation before an equity court will agree not to set aside a transaction); Pappas v. Moss, 303 F.
Supp. 1257, 1276 (D.N.J. 1969) (holding directors and officers liable for engaging in selfdealing transactions because they failed to prove the fairness, honesty, and reasonableness
of the transactions); International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 576
(Tex. 1963) (iterating that corporate directors and officers must prove that their contracts
with the corporation are fair before the court will uphold the arrangements).
120. See, e.g., Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1181-82, 313 S.W.2d 802, 810 (1958)
(holding a corporate director and officer liable for breach of the duty of loyalty after he
failed to disclose fully "his diversion of his corporation's property and opportunities"); H.B.
Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N.M. 82, 122, 167 P. 436, 449
(1917) (concluding that a director can engage in transactions with the corporation, but must
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Thirty-nine states have codified the duty of loyalty.121 The
statutes vary somewhat, but the majority provide that conflict of
interest transactions are not void or voidable if they are fair to the
corporation and the director or officer fully disclosed any personal
interest in the deal. 12 2 The Vermont statute, however, appears to
leave open the possibility of finding a contract between a director
and the corporation to be voidable.1 23 Other states apparently rely
act in good faith and make a "full and fair disclosure. . . to his fellow directors" of all the
circumstances); Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 117 Utah 530, 542, 218 P.2d 274, 280 (1950)
(stating that "where the management [of the corporation] is interested in any deal with the
corporation . . . then its actions must be open and above board and . . . [i]n such cases
courts of equity will carefully scrutinize the dealings of the management and set aside such
transactions on slight grounds").
121. See infra notes 122-23.
122. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-63 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-041 (1977); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-323 (West 1960 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.124 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-41 (Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-6
(Burns 1984); IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.205 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:84 (West 1969); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 717 (West 1981); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-419 (1985);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1545 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 (West 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-413 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2040.01 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 78.140 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:6-8 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-30(b) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.9-51 (1985); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.60
(Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1030 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.265
(1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986); RI. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-37.1
(1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); TENN CODE ANN. § 48-1-816
(1984); Tx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. art. 2.35-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1691 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-25 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180-355 (West Supp. 1986).
Indiana's current law will be repealed effective August 1, 1987. The new law will be IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-2 (Burns Supp. 1986). Similarly, Tennessee's old corporation statute
will be replaced by TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-8-302 (Supp. 1986), effective October 1, 1987. The
standards remain the same in both states.
Although the language varies from state to state, all state statutes essentially provide
that a transaction involving a conflict of interest is not void or voidable because of the
director's or officer's interest, or because the director or officer attended a meeting at which
the transaction was approved, if the interest or relationship was fully disclosed and the
transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation at the time it was authorized. Authorization by a majority of disinterested board members or ratification by a majority of the
shareholders also can prevent the action from being void or voidable.
123. The Vermont statute provides:
A contract may be made between a corporation and one or more of the directors, if the
contract is approved by a quorum of the board of directors, the contracting director not
being present. In entering into such contract, the directors shall act in good faith, and,
if their good faith is attacked, the burden shall be upon them to prove it. Subject to
these provisions, such contract shall be voidable by the corporation only in case it
would have been voidable if made with a stranger. The term "contract" as used herein
is intended to include loans, and corporation guarantees of personal obligations.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1888 (1984).
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on the common law to limit a director's
or officer's ability to en1 24
gage in conflict of interest transactions.
The duty of loyalty becomes an issue in a variety of situations.
Perhaps the most obvious examples of conflict of interest transactions occur when directors and officers engage in self-dealing

25

or

opportunity. 126

usurp a corporate
Conflicts of interest also can occur when corporations with interlocking directorates enter into
agreements with each other.' Another potential conflict of inter124. The following states have not codified the duty of loyalty: Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
125. See, e.g., Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927) (holding
directors liable to the corporation for the amount of secret profits made from the corporation's purchase of property at an inflated price from a director who held an option on the
land); H.B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N.M. 82, 167 P. 436
(1917) (holding that a director or officer who makes secret profits while acting in an official
capacity is liable to the corporation for the profits); cf. Simpson v. Spellman, 522 S.W.2d
615, 619-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (maintaining that "a director may conduct personal transactions with his corporation if he can prove that he has not gained unconscionable or secret
profits in the transaction and that he has dealt openly, honestly, and fairly with the corporation and the stockholders").
Self-dealing also can occur when a parent corporation, "by virtue of its domination of
[its] subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of
the subsidiary." Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720.
126. See, e.g., Raines, 228 Ark. at 1180, 313 S.W.2d at 808-09 (concluding that one
who is both a director and an officer has a duty to refrain from engaging in a competing
business and depriving the corporation of the director/officer's skills and abilities); Sequoia
Vacuum Sys., 229 Cal. App. 2d at 286, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (stating that a director or officer
"may not enter into a competing enterprise which cripples or injures . . . [the] corporation
of which he remains an officer or director"); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(1939) (holding a corporate officer liable for usurping a corporate opportunity that should
have been offered to the corporation).
The Corporate Director's Guidebook advises:
When an opportunity. . .to acquire another business enterprise, to acquire property,
• . . or to seize any other business advantage, comes to the attention of the corporate
director as a result of his relation to the corporation in a way that would permit its
personal realization, and is relevant to the enterprise's present or prospective business
activities, the director must first present it to his corporation. Only after informed evaluation and a determination (by disinterested peers) that the corporation should not
pursue such corporate opportunity, should the corporate director pursue the matter for
his own account or for the benefit of others.
Guidebook, supra note 41, at 1600.
127. See, e.g., Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145
Colo. 413, 418-19, 359 P.2d 665, 668 (1961) (stating that courts will scrutinize carefully a
contract between corporations with common directors and find it voidable if it is unfair, and
that, regardless of the fairness of the deal, the contract will be voidable if the vote of common directors "is necessary to form a quorum of the board and to effectuate the transaction"); cf. Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 280-81, 166 N.E.2d 793,
800 (1960) (holding that "transactions between corporations with common directors may be
avoided only if unfair," and that the common directors have the burden of proving fairness)
(emphasis in original).
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est situation exists when loans are made between the corporation
and one of its directors or officers. 128 The validity of these transac-

tions depends on the law of the particular jurisdiction. 129
Courts scrutinize alleged conflict of interest transactions very
carefully. 30 The party alleging a breach of the duty of loyalty initially bears the burden of proving the existence of a conflict of interest.1 3 1 Once a conflict is established, however, the burden of
proof shifts to the director or officer to show that the transaction
was intrinsically fair to the corporation. 32 Most jurisdictions will
uphold a transaction involving a conflict of interest if the interested directors or officers fully disclosed their position and if the
transaction was approved by a majority of disinterested directors
or was ratified by a majority of the stockholders.' Other courts
will not uphold a transaction, in spite of its fairness to the corporation, unless the interested directors or officers fully disclosed their
interest. 34 If the directors or officers meet their burden of proof,
128. See, e.g., Foster v. Arata, 74 Nev. 143, 153, 325 P.2d 759, 764 (1958) (concluding
that loans made by directors and officers to the corporation were not void because they were
made openly, fairly, and for the benefit of the corporation); M. FEUER, supra note 31, at 59
(explaining that conflicts of interest can occur "when the corporation lends to its directors
or officers ...[but] such transactions will generally be upheld, since they presumptively
advance the interests of the corporation").
129. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
130. See Comment, supra note 20, at 782; see also Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 117
Utah 530, 542, 218 P.2d 274, 280 (1950).
131. See Arsht, supra note 54, at 116 (stating that "the party challenging the transaction must prove self-dealing or personal interest to make the [business judgment rule] defense inapplicable").
132. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921) (concluding that in deals involving corporations with common board members, the burden of
proving fairness is on the parties seeking to uphold the transactions); Backus v. Finklestein,
23 F.2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Popperman v. Rest Haven Cemetery, Inc., 162 Tex. 255, 259,
345 S.W.2d 715, 717 (1961).
133. See, e.g., Rinn v. Asbestos Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 1938) (concluding
that a transaction of personal interest to some directors of the corporation is not invalid
when two-thirds of the board members who approved the contract were disinterested and no
evidence demonstrated "bad faith, fraud or ignorance upon the part of the majority" of the
board), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 555 (1939); Healy v. Geilfuss, 37 Del. Ch. 502, 510, 146 A.2d 5,
10 (1958) (finding that stockholder ratification of acts alleged to be breaches of the duty of
loyalty "cures any voidable board action, . . . [unless it] constitutes a gift of corporate assets to [the board members] themselves or is ultra vires, illegal or fraudulent").
Most state statutes provide that a conflict of interest transaction is not automatically
void or voidable if interested directors disclose their interest and the action is approved by a
majority of disinterested board members or ratified by a majority of the shareholders. See
supra note 122.
134. See, e.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir.
1955) (stating that "where interested directors participate in a transaction and their votes
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they are not liable to the corporation or its shareholders. 135 Conversely, if the directors or officers are unable to prove full disclosure or fairness, they may be liable in damages or the court may
rescind the transaction.13 6 The business judgment rule provides no
7
shelter for directors and officers who breach the duty of loyalty1'
Directors and officers may attempt to escape liability by establishing that they had no direct involvement with the corporate decision creating the alleged breach of loyalty.' 3 Even if a director
does not participate directly in approving the transaction, a breach
of the duty of loyalty may occur if the director wields enough
power to dominate the other directors.1 3 9 Under these circumstances, if the corporate decision works to the dominant director's
advantage, the dominant director may be liable for self-dealing or
some other breach of the duty of loyalty. 14 0
VI.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of the labels employed, courts have established
that corporate directors and officers are fiduciaries to their corporations and its shareholders. Consequently, directors and officers
must conform to prescribed standards for the duty of care and the
are necessary to consummate it, the transaction is voidable irrespective of its fairness" to
the corporation).
135. See, e.g., Rinn v. Asbestos Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 555 (1939); Simpson v. Spellman, 522 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
136. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (holding that an
officer who usurped a corporate opportunity was liable to the corporation for the value of
the stock of and the dividends paid by the competing enterprise); Dixmoor Golf Club v.
Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927) (declaring that directors who earned secret profits
while acting in their corporate capacity were liable to the corporation in the amount of the
profits plus interest).
137. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
138. For example, directors and officers may claim lack of direct involvement if they
abstained from voting on the transaction at issue.
139. William Knepper, an attorney with Knepper, White, Arter & Hadden in Columbus, Ohio, states as follows:
Dominating directors are common in closely held corporations and are found occasionally in public corporations. The influence and predominance of such a director may
effectively control the other directors even though he refrains from voting or absents
himself from meetings when votes are taken on matters in which he is personally interested. It is thus the rule that a dominating director cannot support his conflict-ofinterest transaction on the ground that the other directors approved the transaction
without his visible participation.
W. KNEPPER, supra note 3,§ 2.10.
140. See, e.g., Fowle Memorial Hosp. Co. v. Nicholson, 189 N.C. 44, 49, 126 S.E. 94, 97
(1925) (holding that "a director who exercises a controlling influence over the codirectors
cannot defend a purchase by him of corporate property on the ground that his action was
approved by them" when the transaction was not made fairly).
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duty of loyalty. Although the standards for the duty of care have
varied over time and among jurisdictions, they have delineated expectations for the minimum degree of care that a director or officer
owes to the corporation. Interestingly, the current standards and
expectations are not significantly different from those announced
by the early courts. The earliest cases disagreed on whether ordinary or gross negligence was the correct standard of care. This debate continues today. The requirement of loyalty to the corporation remains essentially intact, but the validity of a transaction
when a breach of the duty of loyalty occurs has changed appreciably. Just as the early courts sought to define the parameters of
directors' and officers' responsibilities and behavior, today's courts
engage in the same endeavor.
MARCIA M. MCMURRAY

